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1 
The Clean Power Plan: 
Testing the Limits of Administrative Law and the Electric Grid 
-- GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. – (forthcoming 2016) 
Emily Hammond* & Richard J. Pierce, Jr.** 
The Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) Clean Power Plan (“CPP”) is one of 
the most controversial and highest-stake rule ever issued by any agency. 1  Released in final form 
on August 4, 2015,2 the rule is aimed at existing electric power plants and establishes carbon 
dioxide emission reduction requirements for states.  EPA projects that if each state meets its 
target, emissions would be about twenty percent less than 2012 levels by 2030.3  Proponents of 
the rule maintain that it is essential to mitigating the potentially devastating effects of climate 
change.4  Opponents, by contrast, argue that it is unlikely to be effective for its intended purpose 
and that it jeopardizes the reliability of the electricity grid and the wellbeing of the U.S. 
* Associate Dean for Public Engagement and Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School.
** Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, the George Washington University Law School.  The authors thank Ann 
Carlson, Joel Eisen, Rob Glicksman, and members of the PUC Clean Energy Collaborative workshop  for their 
helpful comments.  
1 There are arguably several metrics along which the CPP might qualify:  impact on utilities (compliance costs from 
$1.4 to 8.4 billion annually); climate benefits ($20 billion by 2030); or expansive interpretation of statutory authority. 
See EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Clean Power Plan Final Rule, ES-9-10, ES-20 (Aug. 2015) (presenting 
these figures, additional data, and assumptions).  A coal-industry funded study, by contrast, puts the annual energy 
sector costs at $29-39 billion and estimates costs to the U.S. economy ranging from $64-79 billion from 2022-2033. 
NERA ECON. CONSULTING, ENERGY AND CONSUMER IMPACTS OF EPA’S CLEAN POWER PLAN 5 (Nov. 7, 2015). On 
the final point regarding statutory authority, see infra for our argument that EPA has jurisdictional authority to issue 
the CPP.  
2 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 64,661–65,120 (Oct. 23, 2015) [hereinafter CPP] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
3 This is a projection, not a requirement.  Further, the widely reported “requirement” of a 32% reduction below 2005 
levels is based on the same projection but extrapolated to 2005 because 2005 is the year of reference for many of the 
United States’s international commitments.  See Nathan Richardson, 2005 v .2012 in EPA’s Proposal, RESOURCES
FOR THE FUTURE, June 4, 2014, http://common-resources.org/blog/2014/2005-vs-2012-epas-proposal (explaining 
common misperceptions regarding the requirements and dates).  
4 Remarks by the President in Announcing the Clean Power Plan, Aug. 3, 2015, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2015/08/03/remarks-president-announcing-clean-power-plan (calling CPP “single most important step 
America has ever taken in the fight against global climate change”). 
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economy.5  We are in the awkward position of agreeing with both the proponents and the 
opponents of the CPP.  We want the rule to succeed in accomplishing its intended purpose but 
we fear it may have serious unintended adverse effects on the performance of the U.S. electricity 
grid and the economics of the power sector.  Further, we have serious concerns about the ability 
of administrative law doctrine to manage the litigation that is to come.6 
 To frame our discussion, we here offer a few observations on the scope of the Agency 
action at issue.7  The CPP has been the subject of intense study and controversy since its 
proposal in 2014.  After eliciting 4.3 million comments, EPA published the final rule along with 
a statement of basis and purpose that is over 1500 pages long.8  The Agency’s accompanying 
regulatory impact analysis, technical support, and legal documents span nearly 1000 more.9  The 
many controversial substantive decisions and policy decisions embodied in the CPP are matched 
only by the intense debate whether the supporting legal bases are lawful.  For example, the CPP 
unapologetically picks winners and losers among electricity fuels; most prominently, it favors 
natural gas and renewables over coal.10  This choice—which targets the largest source of 
                                                
5 Nicolas Loris, Four Big Problems with the Obama Administration’s Climate Change Regulations, HERITAGE.ORG, 
Aug. 14, 2015 (“The climate impact of the Clean Power Plan will be meaningless.”); Scott Segal, Lots of Pain with 
Questionable Benefits, U.S. NEWS DEBATE CLUB, Aug. 5, 2015 (“We can expect significant potential threat to the 
electric reliability upon which our modern way of life depends.”). 
6 Cf. In re W.V., Emergency Pet’n for Extraordinary Writ, No. 15-1277 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 13, 2015) (seeking 
emergency stay of CPP prior to rule’s publication in Federal Register); cf. In re Murray Energy, 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015) (denying petition for writ of prohibition to stop EPA from issuing final rule).   
7 See also infra Part I (describing major attributes of CPP). 
8 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3)(A)-(C) (mandating that statement of basis and 
purpose include factual data, methodology, and legal interpretations and policy considerations underlying rules).  
This elaboration is distinct from that of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (“concise statement of basis and purpose”), but 
it tracks the courts’ interpretation of the APA.  Cf. Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in 
Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1732 (2011); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Waiting for Vermont Yankee III, 
IV, and V? A Response to Beerman and Lawson, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 902, 920 (2007) (“the most important 
factor that explains the length of informal rulemakings is hard-look review”). 
9 EPA, CLEAN POWER PLAN FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS, http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/clean-power-plan-
existing-power-plants (last visited Sept. 2, 2015) (providing links and page information). 
10 See CPP, supra note 2, at 64,667 (listing building block 2 as “[s]ubstituting increased generation from lower-
emitting existing natural gas combined cycle units for reduced generation from higher-emitting affected steam 
generating units”). 
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baseload power in the United States11—has attracted fierce opposition from the coal industry and 
legislators from coal states such as West Virginia, Kentucky, Wyoming, and North Dakota.12  On 
the other hand, states that have already taken significant steps toward reducing coal-fired power 
and increasing the use of natural gas and renewables—like California,13—are on on-track for 
compliance without needing to make any major changes.   
From a legal standpoint, most of the arguments center on whether EPA has jurisdiction to 
promulgate the CPP.  The agency’s basis is section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).  As we 
briefly discuss below, two competing versions of that section are published in the Statutes At 
Large, and they point in opposite jurisdictional directions.14  Moreover, whether EPA may 
regulate “beyond the fence line” of individual power plants and focus on the electricity system as 
a whole is a hotly contested matter of statutory interpretation.15  Other issues include whether the 
many interstitial interpretive and policymaking decisions within the CPP would survive judicial 
scrutiny.  And the legality of EPA’s simultaneously issued regulations for new and modified 
power plants, which are a legal predicate to the CPP itself, are also a matter of debate.16   
 The purpose of this article is not simply to repeat the already well-developed, rigorous 
debate that adheres to each policy and legal choice embodied in the CPP.17  Rather, we discuss 
four issues that are raised by the CPP but that have not yet attracted the attention and analysis 
                                                
11 EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015, ELECTRICITY GENERATION, Fig. 31 (Apr. 14, 2015). 
12 In re W.V., No. 15-1277. 
13 Press Release, Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Statement on President Obama’s Clean Power Plan (Aug. 3, 
2015). 
14 Compare Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 2399, 2574 (1990) (Senate amendment), with Pub. L. No. 101-
549, § 108(g), 104 Stat. 2399, 2467 (1990) (House amendment).  See also CPP, supra note 2, at 64,711–12 (noting 
differences); infra Part ___ (discussing this issue). 
15 See CPP, supra note 2, at 64,760 (discussing interpretation of “system of emissions reduction” and beyond-the-
fence line comments); infra Part II.C. (discussing this issue). 
16 Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary 
Sources:  Electric Utility Generating Units, -- Fed. Reg. –, at 16 (Aug. 3, 2015) [hereinafter NSPS]. 
17 Compare, e.g., William W. Buzbee et al., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, THE CLEAN POWER PLAN: ISSUES TO 
WATCH, Issue Alert No. 1506 (Aug. 2015) (largely arguing for upholding CPP on each policy and legal issue), with 
Nicolas D. Loris, THE HERITAGE FOUND., THE MANY PROBLEMS OF EPA’S CLEAN POWER PLAN AND REGULATIONS:  
A PRIMER, No. 3025 (July 15, 2015) (largely arguing for vacating the CPP on each policy and legal issue).  
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they deserve.  After summarizing the main elements of the CPP, we consider: (1) the 
administrative law issues related to whether and to what extent reviewing courts should defer to 
the EPA’s two statutory interpretations that provide the jurisdictional basis for the CPP; (2) what 
remedy a court should provide at various procedural postures if it detects or believes likely a 
fatal error in the CPP or the process through which it was issued; (3) the implementation 
challenges associated with the intermittent nature of the electricity supplies that EPA expects 
utilities to substitute for the fossil fuels that now provide most of the nation’s electricity; and (4) 
the implementation challenges associated with the risk that some of the most promising 
approaches for state compliance may be preempted by the Federal Power Act (“FPA”).  The first 
two issues are not unique to the CPP.  These issues create serious problems whenever a court is 
called upon to review a major agency rule, but they are particularly pronounced with respect to 
the CPP.  The third and fourth issues are among the most serious obstacles to successfully 
implementing the CPP. 
I. A Brief Overview of the Clean Power Plan 
 It is now broadly accepted that the world is experiencing major changes in climate, the 
causes of these changes are anthropogenic greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, and, unmitigated, 
these changes will be catastrophic for billions of people, human health, and the environment.18  
Indeed, climate effects are already observable and inevitable, but mitigating these effects by 
reducing GHG emissions is a critical component of both domestic and international climate 
policy.19  Greenhouse gases include several compounds;20 carbon dioxide (“CO2”) is the focus of 
                                                
18 See generally Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gasses Under Section 202(a) of 
the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,523 (Dec. 15, 2009) (determining that greenhouse gas emissions endanger public 
health and welfare). 
19 As is adaptation.  Some of the considerations we raise in Part III.A., infra, are also relevant to adaptation to the 
extent they relate to grid resiliency. 
20 Id. at 66,497 (including carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur 
hexafluoride in endangerment finding). 
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the CPP.21  Any electricity source that burns fossil fuels emits CO2; the amount of emissions is a 
function of the efficiency of the combustion process and the amount of carbon in the fuel 
source.22  Further, there is not at present any economically viable technology-based method 
(such as a scrubber for example) of reducing emissions of CO2 from combustion of any carbon-
based fuel at existing sources.23  Thus, the only currently viable way to reduce GHG emissions 
from fossil-fueled power—which accounts for over thirty-eight percent of U.S. GHG 
emissions24—is to improve efficiency or switch fuels to lower- or zero-carbon sources.25  This 
point is critical for understanding the CPP’s approach, as shown below.   
Though complicated in its details, we can summarize easily the features of the CPP that 
are important for our purposes.  The rule relies on the cooperative federalism structure familiar to 
major federal environmental statutes.26  Once EPA sets new source performance standards for a 
given pollutant found to endanger public health or welfare under section 111(b) of the CAA, the 
states are required to develop implementation plans to reduce emissions of that pollutant from 
existing sources under section 111(d).27  The CPP fits into this scheme by providing the emission 
guidelines and “best system of emissions reduction” (“BSER”) that states must meet in their 
                                                
21 EPA explains that CO2 accounts for 82% of U.S. GHG emissions.  CPP, supra note 2, at 64,677. 
22 Because our focus is on regulation of fossil-fueled power under the CPP, we do not engage the literature on 
lifecycle carbon emissions for each electricity source.  E.g., Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., Fact Sheet, Life-Cycle 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Electricity Generation, at  http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/57187.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2015) (summarizing methodology and results of Life Cycle Assessment Harmonization Project).  
23 See CPP, supra note 2, at 64,690 (“CO2’s huge quantities and lack of reactivity make it challenging to remove 
from a smokestack.”). 
24 Id. at 134. 
25 In its new source performance standards for new electricity generating units, EPA contemplates that new coal-
fired plants will incorporate high-efficiency super-critical pulverized coal utility boilers with partial carbon capture 
and sequestration (CCS).  NSPS, supra note 16, at 16.  As an alternative, the agency will permit co-firing with 
natural gas.  Id. at 17.  Further, EPA suggests that market conditions are such that coal-fired plants are unlikely to be 
built in the future, but if they are, the NSPS will encourage research and development of CCS.  Id. at 17-19.  Overall, 
the agency appears to go out of its way to provide alternatives to CCS in light of its limited current use, its expense, 
the geological needs of the technology, and its potential water-use and water-quality implications.  E.g., id. at 150, 
159, 252-56. 
26 See Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review: Building Legitimacy from 
the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 330-31 (2013) (providing overview of cooperative federalism 
structure and collecting sources). 
27 We discuss the legal issues surrounding this scheme infra Part II.B. 
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plans.28  EPA gives states considerable flexibility with respect to their methods of 
implementation.  Thus, they may adopt source-specific requirements, engage in coordinated 
efforts with other states, develop mass-based trading programs, and/or incorporate other state 
policy measures, like conservation and efficiency, into their approaches.29 
 EPA’s methodology and assumptions in setting the state goals and BSER are of particular 
interest for purposes of our analysis below.  BSER consists of three building blocks.  The first 
block assumes heat efficiency improvements at coal-fired electric generating units (“EGUs”) in 
the 2.1 to 4.3 percent range.30  The second block relies on fuel switching by EGUs from coal to 
natural gas combined cycle (“NGCC”) units, which are the most efficient of natural gas units and 
emit slightly more than one-third of the CO2 of conventional coal-fired units on a mass-per-
MWh basis.31 The third building block relies on fuel-switching by EGUs from fossil fuels to new 
zero-emitting renewable generation—primarily wind and solar.32  After calculating BSER 
reductions on a regional basis, EPA applied those expectations to each state’s electricity fuel mix 
to develop state-specific goals.  EPA emphasized that the building blocks “are available to all 
affected EGUs, either through direct investment or operational shifts” or through emissions 
trading.33  States need not require EGUs to apply the building blocks; they may take other 
actions toward meeting state emission reduction plans, which can include credit trading, new 
nuclear construction, and demand-side and efficiency programs.34  However, even if states do not 
precisely adopt BSER, the general concepts of substituting natural gas for coal, and renewables 
                                                
28 See CPP, supra note 2, at 64,669–74.  We discuss the issues surrounding BSER infra Part II.C. 
29 E.g., CPP, supra note 2, at 64,672–74. 
30 Id. at 64,789.  
31 See EPA, CO2 Emission Performance Rate and Goal Computation Technical Support Document for CPP Final 
Rule 11 Tbl. 4 (Aug. 2015) (showing emission rates for sources in Eastern Interconnection). 
32 CPP, supra note 2, at 64,807 (also listing geothermal and hydropower). 
33 CPP, supra note 2, at 64,667. 
34 Id. 
Draft – 12.15.2015 – do not cite without authors’ permission 
 7 
for fossil fuels, are expected to play key roles in CPP compliance.35  In the next sections, we first 
consider EPA’s authority to issue the CPP at all; the three issues we consider thereafter relate to 
the second and third building blocks.  
II.  Administrative Law and the Clean Power Plan 
Even prior to EPA’s issuance of the final CPP—and its publication in the Federal 
Register—various opponents of the CPP have sought stays from the D.C. Circuit.36  And 
although that court has not as of this writing considered the merits of the CPP, the dispute is so 
important that the Supreme Court is virtually certain to play a role in the review process.  Of 
course, judicial review is an ordinary feature of major rulemakings.37  A typology of potential 
defects is set out in the CAA itself38 and parallels the scope-of-review provisions in section 706 
of the APA.39  We expect the petitioners to make the two most frequent objections to the legality 
of any rule: (1) that it is in excess of statutory jurisdiction;40 and that it is (2) arbitrary and 
capricious41 because the Agency did not explain adequately (a) its critical policy choices 
underlying the rule; and/or (b) its responses to comments that raised well-supported questions 
about the practicality and wisdom of the rule.42  In Part A below, we offer our observations only 
with respect to the largest issues involving statutory jurisdiction.  In Part B below, we consider 
the matter of remedies as the issue relates to both statutory authority and the arbitrary and 
capricious standard. 
                                                
35 For projections of the future electricity fuel mix under various scenarios, see EIA, Under proposed Clean Power 
Plan, natural gas, then renewables, gain generation share, May 27, 2015, at 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=21392.  
36 See discussion supra at Part II.C.1 
37 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (providing grounds for judicial review).  As discussed infra Part II.B., would-be petitioners 
must satisfy a variety of reviewability requirements. 
38 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9). 
39 The parallel APA and CAA provisions are interpreted as having the same meaning.  Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 
1053, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
40 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C); see generally RICHARD J. PIERCE, Jr., I ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, ch. 3 (5th ed. 
2010). 
41 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
42 See generally PIERCE, supra note 40, at 593-94. 
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First, however, we note that the wisdom of the administrative law doctrine surrounding 
these grounds for judicial reversal is the subject of enduring debates.  There is evidence that 
agencies have so internalized the court-imposed requirements of administrative law doctrine43 
that—depending on whom one asks—agencies are either hopelessly ossified44 or demonstrably 
democratic.45  Layered over these concerns is a broader challenge of administrative law—
managing the reliance interests of regulated parties and statutory beneficiaries while 
accommodating separation-of-powers concerns.  Any time an agency issues a rule that requires 
major changes of the regulated community, that community is faced with potentially enormous 
expenditures.  If regulated entities undertake those expenditures while a rule is being challenged, 
what are they to do if the rule is ultimately vacated?  And if they do not undertake those 
expenditures, what of the public benefits that were not realized before the rule was ultimately 
upheld?  Whether or not (or whenever) a court intervenes, it will also be mindful of its place in 
the constitutional structure—both ensuring the agency stays within its jurisdictional boundaries 
and deferring to the agency’s expertise and place within the executive branch. 
Second, we emphasize that we do not attempt here to set forth all the legal arguments that 
will surely be briefed, nor is our focus on the debate regarding the wisdom of administrative law 
doctrine.  Instead, we argue that the CPP strains the limits of administrative law itself.  This 
concern is best illustrated by two issues:  judicial review of EPA’s interpretation of the CAA; 
and the relationship between procedural postures, remedies, and reliance. 
A. Statutory Authority for the CPP 
                                                
43 See generally Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999 (2015) 
(describing results of empirical study of agency drafters’ perceptions of administrative law doctrine). 
44 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 65 (1995). 
45 Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review:  Building Legitimacy from the 
Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 355 (2013). 
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There are two critical interpretive issues related to EPA’s statutory authority to 
promulgate the CPP.  The first—commonly called the section 112 exemption issue—relates to 
EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs from EGUs at all.  The second—commonly called the 
beyond-the-fence-line issue—relates to how EPA determines what constitutes BSER (which is 
the premise upon which the entire CPP is based).  This section briefly reviews the issues before 
considering the applicable administrative law. 
 First, EPA’s authority for the CPP comes from section 111(d) of the CAA.  This 
provision contemplates emission standards for existing sources, and cross-references section 112.  
Section 112 governs air toxics, and the cross-reference creates an exclusion from regulation 
under section 111(d).46  What exactly constitutes the exclusion is unclear because when Congress 
amended section 111 in 1990, it made a serious error.   It enacted two different versions of the 
exclusion.  The House version of the amendment seems to preclude any regulation of a source 
category under section 111(d) if EPA already regulates that source category under section 112.47  
The Senate version, by contrast, appears to exclude from section 111(d)’s reach only pollutants 
already regulated under section 112.48  In 1995, when EPA first had occasion to consider this 
discrepancy, it concluded that it was required to give effect to the House version and could not 
regulate sources already regulated under section 112.49  In the statement of the basis and purpose 
                                                
46 41 U.S.C. § 7411(d). 
47 Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 108(g), 104 Stat. 2399, 2467 (1990). At the time the CPP was promulgated, EPA regulated 
EGUs’ toxic air emissions under §112 (the “MATS rule”).  Although the Supreme Court held unreasonable EPA’s 
interpretation of § 112 as precluding cost considerations in deciding whether to regulate, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 
2699 (2015), the rule had not been stayed pending litigation.  The D.C. Circuit has not yet determined whether to 
remand with vacatur, but Chenery v. SEC (Chenery I) ought to require any analysis to be based on the agency’s 
reasoning at the time it made its decision; here, the CPP was predicated on the MATS rule’s presence.  See also 
Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2710 (insisting on adhering to Chenery notwithstanding presence of other cost-benefit 
information in the record).  Thus, even if the D.C. Circuit vacates the MATS rule, that decision ought not moot the § 
112 exclusion issue here.  See also CPP, supra note [1], at 64,697 (“[T]he MATS rule remains in place at this 
time.”).  
48 Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 2399, 2574 (1990). 
49 EPA, Air Emissions from Municipal Solid Waste Landfills—Background Information for Final Standards and 
Guidelines, Pub. No. EPA-453/R-94-021, at 5-6, available at www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/landfill/bidfl.pdf; see also 
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of the CPP, however, EPA decided that its prior interpretation of the section 112 exclusion was 
wrong.50  The Agency concluded that the House version is ambiguous, and the best resolution of 
the two versions is “the [s]ection 112 Exclusion does not bar the regulation under [section 111(d)] 
of non-HAP [hazardous air pollutants] from a source category, regardless of whether that source 
category is subject to standards for HAP under CAA section 112.”51  Parties that challenge the 
validity of the CPP will argue EPA’s initial interpretation of section112 was correct and that its 
new interpretation is erroneous.  
 The next statutory argument petitioners will make is that the second and third building 
blocks of the CPP are beyond EPA’s power to implement section 111(d).  As mentioned above, 
section 111(d) provides that EPA must issue regulations under which states establish “standards 
of performance.”52  That phrase is defined as: 
[A] standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission 
limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission 
reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and any 
nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements) the 
Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated.53 
 
The key legal argument here is that the massive fuel switching envisioned by the CPP does not 
qualify as a “standard.”54  Traditionally, EPA has established technology-based standards that 
require emission reductions at individual sources.  EPA’s new source performance standards for 
CO2 illustrate that approach.55  The Agency set an emission rate for CO2 at new coal-fired power 
                                                                                                                                                       
Revision of December 2000 Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Electric Utility 
Steam Generating Units and the Removal of Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units from the 
Section 112)(c) List, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,994, 16,031 (Mar. 29, 2005) (reaching same interpretation), held arbitrary and 
capricious on other grounds, New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
50 CPP, supra note 2, at 64,710–11. 
51 CPP, supra note 2, at 64,711. 
52 41 U.S.C. § 7411(d). 
53 Id. § 7411(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
54 Petitioners might also contend that EPA failed to adequately consider the factors listed in the definition’s 
parenthetical, perhaps for some of the reasons we discuss in Part III, infra. 
55 See generally NSPS, supra note 25. 
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plants, and then it attempted to support the standard by referencing technologies and operational 
changes that could be used to achieve those standards.56  The first building block of the CPP is a 
variant of this type of traditional standard—it requires coal-fired EGUs to improve their 
efficiency to achieve fewer emissions.  But the much larger second and third blocks of the CPP 
go “beyond the fence-line” of a single plant and therefore arguably are not “standards” within the 
meaning of the CAA.  In other words, petitioners will argue that EPA lacks the statutory 
authority to use building blocks 2 and 3 as BSER.  
B. Judicial Review of EPA’s Jurisdictional Interpretations 
When courts review agencies’ interpretations of statutes they administer, the typical 
analytical framework is that set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.57 Chevron, of course, traditionally involves a two-step analysis that asks first 
whether Congress has directly spoken; if not, the statute is ambiguous and courts should defer to 
an agency’s permissible interpretation.58  Notably, Chevron extends to an agency’s interpretation 
of the scope of its own jurisdiction; it is not limited to smaller interpretive questions involving 
how the agency applies its authority.59  Under the holding of Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications 
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, if a court reviewing an agency’s interpretation determines 
that the statute has a clear meaning, the agency is not free on remand to depart from that 
determination.60  But if a court determines that the statute is ambiguous, the agency is free to 
                                                
56 We do not here elaborate our concerns that the NSPS are arbitrary and capricious. 
57 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  The two-step framework provides that courts must ask first whether 
Congress has directly spoken; if not, the statute is ambiguous and courts should defer to an 
agency’s permissible interpretation.   
58 Id. at 842-43. 
59 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1869-71 (2013). 
60 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). 
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later adopt a different interpretation provided that interpretation is permissible.61  Moreover, 
there is no heightened standard of review when an agency makes such a change.62   
 
 
In explaining its rationale for how it reconciled the competing versions of section 111(d), 
EPA did not explicitly walk through a Chevron analysis,63 relying instead on traditional means of 
statutory interpretation such as considering the language of the provisions, the legislative history, 
the purpose of the statute, and the like.64  EPA’s discussion of BSER similarly does not explicitly 
reference Chevron, but it follows Chevron’s logic.  For example, it notes that BSER is undefined, 
“broad and capacious,” and it emphasizes that Congress gave EPA interpretive authority to 
determine BSER65—considerations familiar to Chevron step one.  The Agency next argues the 
interpretation is reasonable and consistent with the purpose and legislative history of the CAA as 
well as with the “structure and economics of the utility power sector.”66 
Notwithstanding the Chevron paradigm that features so strongly in this and other 
administrative law discussions, we highlight here what neither side has explicitly engaged, but 
what we expect is a driving concern:  the bigger-picture issue of regulatory stability lurking 
behind Chevron. To demonstrate, we will briefly sketch how Chevron might apply to each issue 
and what the long-term ramifications might be.  
                                                
61 Id. at  
62 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514-15 (2009). 
63 It cited the doctrine in a footnote.  CPP, supra note 1, at 64,719 n.301. 
64 Some courts include these considerations in step one, others in step two.  See Emily Hammond et al., Judicial 
Review of Statutory Issues Under the Chevron Doctrine, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF 
FEDERAL AGENCIES 65-100 (collecting examples).  We think the best characterization of EPA’s approach is to place 
its analysis in step two. 
65 E.g., CPP, supra note 1, at 64,761. 
66 Id. 
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 Turning first to the section 112 exclusion issue, it seems unlikely that  EPA would 
succeed at step one by arguing that the statute is clear, given its prior opposite interpretation of 
the exclusion.67  Given the inconsistency of the two versions of section112 and EPA’s 
inconsistent interpretations of that section, it would be hard for a court to support a conclusion 
that Congress “directly spoke to the issue.”  Thus, if a court applies Chevron, it should hold that 
Congress did not resolve the issue and, hence, it must uphold the EPA interpretation if it is 
reasonable.68  
     Second, whether Congress directly spoke to the beyond-the-fence-line issue, is a question 
that could be answered intellectually honestly in support of either clear language or ambiguity.  
That outcome likely depends on a reviewing court’s choice of the many approaches to step one, 
the variety and merits of which we do not endeavor to survey here.69 But by way of example, 
dictionary definitions have figured prominently in judicial analyses at step one,70 and definitions 
here point in opposing directions.  One definition of “standard,” for example, supports a plain 
meaning akin to what EPA has done in the past: “a level of quality achievement, etc. that is 
considered acceptable or desirable,” e.g., “something set up and established by authority as a rule 
for the measure of quantity, weight, extent, value, or quality.”71  These concepts do not seem to 
fit with massive fuel switching, and EPA has never before understood its statutory mandate in 
                                                
67 This likely explains EPA’s avoidance of the step one issue in the relevant portion of the CPP. 
68 As this analysis and that regarding the beyond-the-fence-line issue demonstrate, we do not attempt an exhaustive 
briefing of Chevron as applied to the CPP.  
69 We have done so elsewhere.  Cf. PIERCE, supra note [40], §§ 3.5-.6; Hammond, supra note ___ , at 77-93 
(documenting and discussing the many approaches to step one). 
70 Id. at 82-83 (collecting sources). 
71 Merriam Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/standard (last visited Oct. 18, 2015). 
Note that EPA avoided an analogous issue with respect to CO2 emission standards for new motor vehicles, 
following Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 597 (2007), by conducting a joint rulemaking with the National Highway 
Transportation Safety Administration, which has clear authority to require reductions in fossil fuel use.  See Light-
Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, Final Rule, 75 
Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,324 (2010) (explaining that rule is joint rulemaking).  
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that way.72  On the other hand, “system” might permit the fuel-switching approach.  “System” 
means “a group of related parts that move or work together,” e.g., “a regularly interacting or 
interdependent group of items forming a unified system.”73  EPA reasons that “system” works 
well for the U.S. electricity grid, which it accurately describes as an interdependent and 
interconnected group of EGUs that must function as a whole.74  EPA also argues persuasively 
that it must rely primarily on mandatory fuel-switching by the interdependent group of EGUs 
that comprise the grid to achieve significant emissions reductions because CO2 is unique as a 
pollutant; it cannot be reduced significantly with traditional pollution-control devices.75  Thus, if 
EPA cannot require fuel-switching it has no means of mitigating climate change caused by 
EGUs—notwithstanding its prior determination that GHG emissions endanger public health.76  
These latter arguments help demonstrate that EPA’s interpretation of BSER is permissible and 
not foreclosed by the clear language of the statute.77 
 But for either of these statutory issues—whether the section 112 exemption or the 
beyond-the-fence-line argument—a court’s reaching step two would create a strange situation.  
A new EPA Administrator appointed by a President who does not share President Obama’s 
enthusiasm for the CPP’s approach could adopt the opposite interpretations, and a reviewing 
court would be required to uphold those interpretations as long as they are permissible under the 
reasoning adopted in Brand X.78  Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized that an agency can 
adopt an interpretation of a statute it implements that is inconsistent with its prior interpretation 
                                                
72 Other portions of the statute support the concept of discrete standards applied on a smokestack- or plant-wide-
basis. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1)(B) (“in applying a standard of performance to any particular source, . . .” 
73 Merriam Webster, supra note 71.  
74 CPP, supra note 1, at 64,677–78. 
75 Id. at 64,690. 
76 See Coal. for Responsible Reg. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d in part on other grounds, 134 S. Ct. 
2427 (2014) (upholding endangerment finding) 
77 Once again, this brief discussion provides only a small summary of the analysis supporting a determination that 
EPA’s interpretation is permissible.  Cf. CPP, supra note 2, at Pt. V.A.1, p. 64,718 (presenting EPA’s full analysis). 
78 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-83 (2005). 
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without providing any heightened explanation that the new interpretation is better than the old 
interpretation.79  An agency needs only to establish that the new interpretation is permissible.80  
In other words, the ordinary step two analysis applies—and we would expect agencies’ win rates 
at step two to be quite high.81  
 Yet it does not seem sensible to have a legal regime in which EPA’s view of its 
jurisdictional authority (the section 112 exemption issue) and the fundamental predicate of the 
CPP (the beyond-the-fence-line issue) can change dramatically every four to eight years.  
Implementing the CPP requires owners of EGUs to make massive investments in long-lived 
assets, the value of which will depend critically on the legal regime in which they operate for 
decades.  It would be difficult to persuade investors to put billions of dollars at risk by making 
those investments knowing that the legal regime could easily change in ways that would reduce 
significantly the value of those investments.  At a minimum, that legal uncertainty would 
increase significantly the cost of implementing the CPP by increasing the cost of the capital 
required to implement the CPP.  
     This is a way in which the CPP strains administrative law.  The Brand X decision has 
been criticized primarily on separation-of-powers grounds; Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion, 
for example, states:  “Article III courts do not sit to render decisions that can be reversed or 
                                                
79 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514-15 (2009). 
80 Id. at 515. 
81 Studies of affirmance rates under the Chevron doctrine show agency win rates ranging from about 64 to about 
81%.  Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN L. REV. 77, 84 
(2011) (collecting studies and noting slight decrease in win rates over time); cf.  William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren 
E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:  Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron 
to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1129 (2008) (finding Chevron win rate at over 76%, but win rate regardless of 
deference regime at about 68%).  These studies do not necessarily disaggregate steps one and two.  Note that earlier 
studies suggest EPA has a lower than average win rate.  See Jonathan H. Adler, No Intelligible Principles:  The 
EPA’s Record in Federal Court, RPPI POL’Y STUDY NO. 269, at 10 (reporting 41% Chevron win rate for EPA in 
D.C. Circuit between 1993 and 2000); Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron, State Farm, and 
EPA in the Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,371, 10,374 (2001) (reporting 53% Chevron 
win rate for EPA between 1991 and 1999). 
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ignored by executive officers.”82  But the CPP shows its impact pragmatically: the reliance 
interests of the regulated industry as well as the public are staggering.  Indeed, the Justices have 
become uncomfortable with this particular effect of the many deference doctrines.83  Those 
doctrines often create a situation in which the law has dramatically different meanings and 
effects depending on the political philosophy of the incumbent President.  Thus, for instance, the 
meaning of many statutes that apply to labor relations varies from pro-union in a Democratic 
administration to pro-management in a Republican administration.84  Recent experience with 
EPA’s regulatory approach to interstate air pollution has illustrated this flip-flopping, as has the 
Agency’s approach to regulating air toxics and GHGs from EGUs under the CAA.85  This is a 
disquieting effect of the deference doctrines in every context,86 but it has the potential to create 
severe problems if it is applied in circumstances like these, where the authority of the agency to 
act at all is under question.87 
                                                
82 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 1017 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
83 See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Future of Deference, -- GEO. WASH. U. L. REV. – (forthcoming) (criticizing 
Brand X for creating regulatory uncertainty).  
84 E.g., Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1205 (2015). 
85 See, e.g., EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014) (upholding Obama-era Cross State 
Air Pollution Rule); North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (invalidating Bush-era Clean Air 
Interstate Rule); see also Emily Hammond, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 
1722  (2011) (collecting other examples of agencies’ changed policies over courses of repeated judicial review).  On 
the air toxics issue, some of the history is recounted in White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 
1229-33 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
86 The presidential control model of administrative law presumably would view executive direction as a legitimizing 
force to counteract our arguments here.  E.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 
(2001); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2 
(2009).  Cf. Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J. 
1763, 1807 (2012) (criticizing presidential control in favor of statutory primacy). 
87 Where to draw the line between types of interpretive issues is a challenging question.  We ourselves have 
somewhat differing views.  Compare Pierce, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (arguing against Brand X 
generally); with Emily Hammond, Chevron’s Generality Principles, 83 FORD. L. REV. 655, 657 (2014) (arguing 
there is “nothing inherently illegitimate in an agency’s revising its interpretation”).  Merely describing some issues 
as jurisdictional and others as interstitial is unsatisfying because, as Justice Scalia explained in City of Arlington, 
ultimately any interpretive question relates to the agency’s statutory authority.  See 133 S. Ct. at 1868 (“No matter 
how it is framed, the question a court faces when confronted with an agency’s interpretation of a statute it 
administers is always, simply, whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of its statutory authority.”). 
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 For the CPP, therefore, a reviewing court might take a cue from the Supreme Court’s 
recent opinion in King v. Burwell.88  The Court had to decide whether a critical provision of the 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) had a meaning that was consistent with the purposes of the ACA 
or had a meaning that would make it virtually impossible to continue to implement the ACA.89 
The provision was so poorly crafted that it is easy to understand why the three dissenting Justices 
concluded that it clearly required a course of action that would erode political support for the 
ACA by depriving the citizens of thirty-one states from access to one of the most valuable 
benefits provided by the Act.90 
 A six-Justice majority believed that the provision at issue was ambiguous.91  Yet—after 
acknowledging that normally such a situation would point to Chevron deference to the IRS’s 
interpretation—the majority declined to apply that approach.92  Why?  The Court explained that 
Chevron is premised on an implicit delegation of interpretive authority to the relevant agency, 
but “[i]n extraordinary cases, . . . there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress 
has intended such an implicit delegation.”93  The Court reasoned that the “deep economic and 
political significance” of the issue was so important that it was not willing to attribute to 
Congress an intent to allow the Agency to adopt its own interpretation of the provision.94 This 
was particularly true because the IRS did not have expertise in health care policy.95   
                                                
88 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
89 See id. at 2492-93 (describing interpretations). 
90 See id. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
91 Id. at 2492 (majority op’n).  Among other things, it considered other provisions of the ACA that were obviously 
inconsistent with the language of the provision at issue and evidence of congressional purpose in reaching this 
determination.  Id. at 2489-92. 
92 Id. at 2488-89. 
93 Id. (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)). 
94 Id. at 2489 (citing Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)).  The majority then relied primarily 
on the policies underlying the ACA to support its own interpretation of the provision, which fit well with the 
purpose of the statute.  Id. at 2491-98. 
95 Id. at 2489. 
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 King was an excellent candidate for the Court’s refusal to accord deference to an 
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term.  The ACA is controversial and has been 
the subject of partisan acrimony.  Whether you like or dislike the ACA, it is hard to believe 
anyone would favor the chaotic situation that would exist if one of the core provisions of the 
ACA was effective only half of the time, depending on the results of each presidential election. 
And for those ascribing to the implicit delegation rationale of Chevron,96 the IRS’s interpretive 
role seems far removed from typical Chevron cases in which there is no doubt about the 
interpreting agency’s expertise.97 
 The pending litigation to review the legality of the CPP is at least as strong a candidate 
for that treatment.  To see why, it is important to note that the Courts has identified several types 
of cases in which Chevron will not apply. King illustrated two:  both the significance of the 
ACA98 and the IRS’s lack of expertise99 supported the Court’s approach.  Other examples 
include situations where more than one agency administers the statute in question,100 and where 
the agency used procedures that were less democratic than those in notice-and-comment 
rulemaking or the APA’s formal methods.101  Ultimately, these categories are born of analyses 
that ask whether Congress intended to delegate the interpretive authority to the agency.102  With 
                                                
96 The Court itself frequently uses such language, e.g., id. at 2488 (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001).  A variety of scholars 
also espouse this view.  E.g. Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6-7, 35 (2015) (arguing in 
support of delegation theory).  The numerous potential rationales for Chevron are collected in numerous places; at 
least one of us does not necessarily think the delegation rationale is particularly compelling.  Cf. Mark Seidenfeld, 
Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 277-88 (2011) (criticizing intent-based rationales).  
97 See Hammond, supra note [86 (Duke piece)], at 1771-74, 1803-04 (describing relevance of expertise in 
determining whether deference is appropriate).  
98 See also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (“we must be guided to a degree 
by common sense as to the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such economic and 
political magnitude to an administrative agency”). 
99 See also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 266 (2006) (noting congressional “unwillingness to cede medical 
judgments to an executive official [U.S. Attorney General] who lacks medical expertise”). 
100 E.g., Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997) (APA).  
101 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 230 (2001). 
102 E.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015). 
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respect to the section 112 exemption issue, it seems very difficult to attribute an intent to 
delegate by a Congress that did not reach agreement on the language it passed.  Because of this 
unique set of facts, moreover, it is not a material point of distinction that EPA here has expertise 
with respect to the CAA (unlike the IRS in King).  Furthermore, the significance of the the CPP 
is enormous, both politically and economically.103  No one would gain from a situation in which 
firms are strongly encouraged to make investments in long-lived assets and then see the value of 
those investments dissipate dramatically a few years later due to political flip-flopping.  
A difficulty with this approach is its indeterminacy: how ought a court decide whether an 
interpretive issue is sufficiently “important” to take it out of the Chevron framework? Granting 
the problematic nature of such an inquiry, we think that the scope of the CPP is such that it is not 
a case on the margins.  Perhaps because of such indeterminacy difficulties, we also note that the 
Court frequently ducks the Chevron issue altogether, applying its own statutory interpretation 
rather than Chevron even when an issue fits the Chevron prerequisites.104 We think the better 
approach is the direct one:  the Court should explain why Chevron is not applicable and use 
EPA’s well-reasoned analysis to reach a favorable jurisdictional decision that cannot be 
disturbed by shifting political whims.105     
This discussion raises the question whether a King approach should be used for both the 
section 112 exemption and the beyond-the-fence-line issues.  On one hand, the former issue is a 
                                                
103 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
104 E.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527-528 (2007) (citing Chevron for generalized agency discretion but 
failing to apply that framework and concluding that statutory text forecloses agency’s interpretation); id. at 553 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The court nowhere explains why this interpretation is incorrect, let alone why it is not 
entitled to deference under Chevron . . . .”); see also Eskirdge & Baer, supra note [81], at 1117-18 (describing large 
number of cases in which Court applied no deference regime at all).. 
105 That is, section 111(d) is meant to ensure there are no regulatory gaps for particular pollutants; while BSER, as 
interpreted by EPA, is perhaps the only way to address GHG emissions from EGUs, making it the best interpretation 
consistent with the CAA’s mandate to regulate pollutants found to endanger the public health and welfare.  GHGs, 
of course, already fit the endangerment criterion.  Admittedly, it is plausible that a court might adopt either of the 
competing interpretations for each issue discussed above.  Leaving our own views aside, it must be emphasized that 
this approach would at least promote regulatory certainty. 
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better candidate for King treatment from a delegation perspective because of the perplexing 
matter of two different statutory amendments in addition to its importance politically and 
economically.  Moreover, it is aimed at EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs from existing EGU’s 
at all, such that shifting interpretations over time would most disturb regulatory stability.  The 
latter issue might not be so compelling because it does not share the unusual statutory 
background and is of second-order jurisdictional importance.  On the other hand, the latter issue 
is certainly jurisdictional—it provides the predicate to EPA’s approach to the CPP—and the 
Supreme Court has instructed that it does not matter for deference regimes what type of 
jurisdictional question is at issue.106  Furthermore, EPA’s interpretation of BSER here provides 
the entire foundation of the CPP (thus carrying the same political and economic significance); a 
new interpretation in 2017 would certainly disturb regulatory stability.107        
 But even if King were not applied to the fence-line issue, we argue that two other recent 
decisions—both involving EPA—point to what might be called “Brand X avoidance” and may 
have particular applicability.  As noted above, Justice Scalia has been a strong critic of Brand X, 
and his approach to Chevron has set clear boundaries on Brand X’s applicability.  In the face of 
ambiguous statutory terms, he has sometimes concluded that EPA’s interpretation is clearly 
foreclosed.  The impact of that approach is best illustrated by two cases.  First, in Michigan v. 
EPA,108 Justice Scalia (writing for the majority) reasoned that EPA’s interpretation of another 
provision of the CAA to preclude cost considerations was clearly beyond the bounds of the 
statute.109  This unusually strong version of step two makes it a practical impossibility for EPA 
                                                
106 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013). 
107 One of us would be reluctant to extend this rationale even further to other non-predicate interpretations within the 
CPP; the other more willing.  See Pierce, supra note 83. 
108 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
109 Id. at 2707.  In fact, all nine Justices appear to agree on this point.  See id. at 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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ever to adopt an interpretation that does not consider cost—notwithstanding the usual Brand X 
norm that would permit flexibility in interpreting ambiguous statutory terms.  
Second, in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,110 Justice Scalia (again writing for the 
majority) reasoned that EPA’s interpretation of yet another provision of the CAA was foreclosed 
by the statute.  There, EPA interpreted the provision “any air pollutant” to include GHG 
emissions for purposes of the prevention of significant deterioration (“PSD”) program.111  The 
Court reasoned that this language was not unambiguous, but rather context-specific;112 and in 
this particular context EPA’s interpretation was foreclosed because it would “overthrow” the 
statutory design.113  Because GHGs are emitted at levels far greater than traditional pollutants, 
PSD regulation would swamp EPA, overwhelm state regulators, and impose billions of dollars in 
costs on both regulated sources and agencies.114  This result would be contrary to the statutory 
design, because Congress clearly intended the PSD provisions to apply only to “major” 
sources.115  Perhaps even more salient to the CPP, the Court emphasized that EPA’s 
interpretation was unreasonable because the Agency was “laying claim to extravagant statutory 
power over the national economy” without clear congressional authorization.116  
It is easy to imagine Justice Scalia writing a similar opinion in reviewing the CPP that 
uses a similar approach to support a holding that no interpretation of section111(d) that 
                                                
110 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
111 Id. at 2439.  The following analysis relates to the Court’s consideration of sources that are not otherwise 
regulated under the PSD program.  See id. at 2447 (describing distinction from “anyway” sources). 
112 Id. at 2442. 
113 Id.  
114 Id. at 2442-43. 
115 Id. at 2443. 
116 Id. at 2444.  Nor did EPA’s Tailoring rule save its construction, because that rule departed from the clear 
statutory text.  Id. at 2445.  The nondelegation overtones are not lost on us.  Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 
531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (noting Congress “must provide substantial guidance on setting air standards that affect 
the entire national economy”). 
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authorizes EPA to regulate “beyond the fence line” can be reasonable.117  However, it would be 
difficult for a court to resolve the interpretative issues raised by the section 112 exclusion 
through use of that method.  The court would have to conclude either that no interpretation of 
any ambiguous statutory language could reasonably allow EPA to regulate GHG emissions from 
EGUs or that no interpretation of any ambiguous statutory language could reasonably prohibit 
EPA from regulating GHG emissions from EGUs.  Any opinion that attempted to support either 
of those extreme propositions would seem disingenuous and, thus, probably motivated by the 
personal beliefs of the judges or Justices. 
C. Remedies 
 Any challenge to the CPP will include a request to stay the rule pending the outcome of 
litigation.  If a court ultimately decides the rule is flawed in some way, it will also need to 
determine the best remedial option—a remand either with or without vacatur.  Two different 
standards are therefore at play, those for: (1) granting a stay; and (2) determining whether to 
remand with vacatur.  We show how these issues have already been framed before considering 
their relevance to the remedial options and accompanying standards.   
  1. Early Issue Development 
 EPA, would-be-petitioners, and (in part) the D.C. Circuit itself have already put forth 
their positions regarding the interests at stake.  After EPA announced the proposed rule in 2014, 
a coal company and various other parties benefited by coal mining or use, sought an 
extraordinary writ enjoining the CPP, arguing that the need to take substantial and costly steps 
toward compliance were already creating significant hardship.118  Acknowledging that “prudent 
organizations and individuals may alter their behavior (and thereby incur costs) based on what 
                                                
117 Here is where we hesitate, because as a policy matter, we favor efforts to reduce GHG emissions. 
118 In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
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they think is likely to come,” the court rejected an invitation to become involved prior to the 
rule’s finalization.119  This outcome is typical.  Extraordinary writs, which are to be issued 
sparingly,120 require: (1) no other adequate means of relief; (2) a clear and indisputable 
entitlement to relief; and (3) the court’s satisfaction that the writ is appropriate.121  Even though 
the final condition enables consideration of equitable factors, courts have resisted requests to 
issue writs founded on hardship in complying with the law.122  
 Similarly, shortly after the final rule’s announcement—but before its publication—
another coalition of states sought another extraordinary writ, seeking a stay of the rule’s 
deadlines until litigation is complete.123  The CAA, however, specifies that petitions must be 
filed within sixty days of publication in the Federal Register.124  And in a terse two-paragraph 
order, the D.C. Circuit rejected the petition.125  Once again, when a regular appeals process is 
available, a court’s interest in proceeding according to the statutory scheme rather than granting 
an extraordinary writ will trump a petitioner’s cry of hardship.126 
Though premature, this early activity provides a preview of some of the fairness and 
reliance issues that will take center stage in the next challenge.  The state petitioners contended 
that relief was justified because the CPP gives states thirteen months from its announcement to 
submit their initial plans, rather than keying the deadline to the date of publication in the Federal 
                                                
119 Id. 
120 In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330, 339 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Henderson, J., diss.). 
121 In re Kellogg Brown & Roots, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
122 Murray Energy, 788 F.3d at 335.  
123 In re W.Va., No. 15-1277 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 13, 2015) [hereinafter “Emer. Pet’n”]. On August 5, 2015, several 
states also filed an application with EPA, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 705, requesting the agency itself to stay the rule’s 
effective date of action.  Id. at 4 n.2. EPA denied the request.  Id. 
124 5 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). 
125 Order, No. 15-1284, Doc. No. 1572185 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 9, 2015).  
126 See U.S. ex rel. Denholm & McKary Co. v. U.S. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 125 F.2d 557, 558 (D.C. Cir 1942) (“the 
use of special writs to review . . . the action of . . . administrative bodies had its origins in the days of the stone age 
of administrative law” when regularized forms of appeal were lacking).   
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Register.127  If petitioners were required to wait until the rules’ publication in the “normal course,” 
they were likely correct that any relief may not come until halfway through the states’ 
preparation time.128  The coal company petitioner put its irreparable injury argument simply: 
“The Final Rule is aimed squarely at coal.”129  After all, the petitioner argued, EPA’s own 
modeling suggests significant plant retirements in 2016.130  Because electricity companies must 
plan several years in advance, the petitioner argued that irrevocable closure decisions would be 
made years before litigation is complete.131 
In response, EPA emphasized that the rule’s actual deadlines are 2018 and beyond; the 
initial state submittal in September 2016 is only a general statement of approaches under 
consideration, progress to date, and a description of opportunities for public input.132  Further, as 
described above, a state can even forgo developing a plan altogether.133  To the coal company’s 
argument of irreparable harm, EPA responded that—with emissions reductions not even slated to 
become effective until 2022—litigation would be complete well before that deadline.134  And 
EPA also underplayed its modeling, noting that while its final rule showed eleven gigawatts of 
coal-fired power ceasing by 2016, the model was meant to be illustrative rather than 
predictive.135 
 That last point underscores what is different about the CPP: both the type and degree of 
regulatory uncertainty during the litigation period are unprecedented.  Regarding type, consider 
the discussion above, which emphasized that typical CAA regulations involve technology 
                                                
127 Emer. Pet’n at 1-2. 
128 See Emer. Pet’n at 3. 
129 Emer. Renewed Pet’n for Extraordinary Writ by Intervenor Peabody Energy Corp., No. 15-1277, Doc. No. 
1567796, at 23 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 13, 2015). 
130 Id. at 24. 
131 Id.  
132 EPA Resp. in Opp’n, No. 15-1277, Doc. No. 1570665, at 25-26 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 31, 2015). 
133 Id. at 26. 
134 Id. at 28-29. 
135 Id. at 29. 
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mandates.136  A regulated entity is likely to know years before such a mandate is finalized that it 
is under consideration; after all, many of the technology-based standards require some basis in 
existing technology.137  Prudent investors—who likely had a hand in developing the applicable 
standards—are likely to begin complying even during the pendency of litigation 
(notwithstanding their predictable cost-based resistance in the courts).138  Here, however, the 
building blocks and flexibility of the CPP do not mandate any particular technology.139  The 
scope of possibilities is so broad as to be overwhelming, and the only message of certainty is that 
EPA has taken aim at coal.  It is perfectly logical, then, that new coal plants are unlikely to be 
built.140  And if—as building block 1 suggests—coal-fired generation is to be replaced with 
natural gas, at least some plant closures appear unavoidable.141  This observation points to the 
difference in degree of the CPP’s impact.  Although typical environmental controls have indirect 
                                                
136 We are focused here on compliance standards, rather than, for example, listing criteria or national air quality 
standards.  Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533-35 (2006) (describing need to consider whether to make 
endangerment finding; Whitman v. American Trucking, 531 U.S. 457, 464-471 (2001) (holding CAA forbids EPA 
from considering cost in setting national ambient air quality standards)..          
137 E.g., best achievable etc. see also Wendy E. Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade:  An Empirical Study of 
EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 111 (2011) (“Industry enjoys a particularly privileged 
position in the development of rules like the air toxic emission standards because industry possesses a great deal of 
in-house information on industrial processes that EPA needs to write the rules.”).  
138 This is what happened in the example of the MATS standards for coal-fired EGUs.  See White Stallion Energy 
Ctr. v. EPA, No. 12-1100 (Oral Arg. Recording at 36:12 – 36:58) (D.C. Cir. Dec. 4, 2015) (counsel for coal-fired 
EGUs arguing D.C. Circuit should not vacate MATS rule on remand, in part because industry has already complied 
and would face stranded costs if there were a vacatur). 
139 This line of reasoning links closely to the “beyond-the-fence line” issue described supra Part II.A. 
140 Perhaps illustrating the broader point about industry responding to the regulatory climate, note that new coal 
plants have not been built for several years.  See EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015, Electricity Generation, Fig. 
35 (2015) (“As a result of the uncertainty surrounding future greenhouse gas legislation and regulations and given its 
high capital costs, very little unplanned coal-fired capacity is added across all the AEO2015 cases.”) [hereinafter 
AEO2015].  
141 Of course, industry may be overstating the point.  The Energy Information Administration, for example, has 
noted that reduced use of coal is strongly related to low natural gas prices. Id. at Fig. 35 (showing mix of capacity 
varies primarily according to natural gas prices); cf. STEVE ISSER, ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING IN THE UNITED 
STATES:  MARKETS AND POLICY FROM THE 1978 ENERGY ACT TO THE PRESENT 87-91 (2015) (describing periods of 
inverse relationship between natural gas prices and coal-fired capacity, aided by technological advances in gas-fired 
generation).    
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impacts on the electrical fuel mix by influencing the relative market price of power,142 the scope 
of the CPP is such that it will alter the design of the markets themselves.143 
  2. Preliminary Injunctive Relief 
The standard on a motion for preliminary injunction is equitable and requires a court to 
consider:  (1) the petitioner’s likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparably 
injury absent the injunction; (3) the possibility of harm to others if the injunction is issued; and 
(4) the public interest.144  The discussion above anticipates the parties’ arguments:  the 
petitioners will contend that EPA lacks authority to issue the CPP (and to do so in the way it has), 
meaning there is a likelihood of success on the merits; the petitioners will also focus on the 
burden of complying with a rule of unprecedented scope; EPA will emphasize the sheer 
magnitude of the climate change problem and the role of the rule in furthering the public interest 
as embodied in the CAA. 
 Short of a quick ruling that the petitioners will likely succeed on the merits—which 
would all but end the litigation145—the real stake at this procedural stage is the rule’s momentum 
at the end of a presidential term.  No doubt EPA would prefer to keep the rule in force so that 
compliance may begin while President Obama is in office.  Even an injunction for a year forces 
                                                
142 See Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, --VAND. L. REV. – 
(forthcoming 2016). 
143 For example, a compliance approach might involve altering least-cost dispatch to account for electricity fuel 
preferences.  This would require a number of steps, including for example approval of new market tariffs by FERC.   
144 Nat’l Wildlife Fed. v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  EPA could have stayed the rule’s effect on 
its own, 5 U.S.C. § 705, but it did not do so.  Note that administrative law doctrine accounts for these interests in 
additional ways.  For example, the availability of pre-enforcement review is predicated on a concern for hardship to 
the regulated industry; the CAA permits even more lenient standards for such review.  See Whitman v. Am. 
Trucking Assn’s, 531 U.S. 457, 479–80 (2000).  
145 Cases usually settle at this point.  There is another important context in which the decision to issue a preliminary 
injunction has devastating effects. The Federal Trade Commission can obtain a preliminary injunction to stop a 
merger through use of a standard that is easier to meet than the standard applicable to the actions of other agencies. 
The issuance of the preliminary injunction is outcome-determinative because the proceeding to resolve the case on 
the merits take so long that the parties to the merger have no choice but to capitulate. See Richard Pierce, The Rocky 
Relationship Between the Federal Trade Commission and Administrative Law, -----GEO. WASH. U. L. REV. ------
(forthcoming 2016). 
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the burden of inertia back to the status quo and buys time for the next administration to change 
its approach.146  This, of course, is the very risk with which we are concerned in the preceding 
section; administrative law doctrine contemplates that agencies will change their approaches.  
When so much is at stake, that aspect of administrative law seems normatively flawed. 
  3. Remanding With or Without Vacatur 
 As we have noted, the variety of ways in which a court might find flaws in the CPP is 
staggering.  For any of these defects, the APA provides that the reviewing court “shall” “set 
aside” the defective “agency action, findings, and conclusions.”147  Despite the mandatory 
wording, courts have never followed this language strictly; sometimes they vacate an agency’s 
decision,148 while other times they simply remand.149  Further, courts have applied both 
approaches to remedy the various types of defects we have identified.150  Doctrinal guidance on 
selecting the approach is sparse,151 but the D.C. Circuit has articulated a balancing test that 
favors remands without vacatur by considering the “seriousness of the . . . deficiencies (and thus 
                                                
146 See Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Bloodsport:  Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 
DUKE L.J. 1671, 1677-78 (2012) (describing fierce political climate and pressure of constant opposition from 
regulated entities that promote statutory goals to erode over time). 
147 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (“the court may reverse”). 
148 See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983) 
(concluding agency failed to supply reasoned analysis and vacating and remanding); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 
143 (1973) (vacating and remanding Comptroller of Currency’s denial of bank charter for failure to explain basis of 
denial). 
149 Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 557 F.3d 165, 191 (9th Cir. 2009) (remanding worker 
safety standard but declining to vacate where “the only identified defect in a standard is the lack of an adequate 
statement of reasons”); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 251 F.3d 1026, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (remanding without 
vacating technical amendments to NOx SIP Call; defect involved adopting new definition of electricity generating 
unit without providing notice and opportunity for comment).  For a discussion of how the remedy interacts with 
multiple remands of the same agency action, see generally Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in 
Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722 (2011). 
150 To be sure, the appropriateness of vacating or not depends on the grounds for a court’s holding that the agency 
acted unlawfully.  If the court holds EPA lacks jurisdiction under § 111(d) to regulate GHGs at all, for example, the 
rule would be ultra vires and the vacation issue moot.  E.g., Coal. for Responsible Reg. v. EPA, 606 Fed. Appx. 6, 7 
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (vacating GHG rules for major stationary sources not already subject to PSD requirements in 
accordance with holding in Utility Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014), which held that EPA lacked 
authority to regulate such sources). 
151 It is also inconsistently applied.  Kristina Daugirdas, Note, Evaluating Remand Without Vacatur:  A New Judicial 
Remedy for Defective Agency Rulemaking, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278, 293-94 (2005).   
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the extent of doubt whether the [A]gency chose correctly), the likelihood that the [A]gency will 
be able to correct the deficiencies on remand and the disruptive consequences of an interim 
change that may itself be changed.”152 
This standard reflects the reality that the practical import of the choice matters deeply: if 
the CPP is vacated, it is extinguished—as if the rule had never been promulgated.153  Not only 
does this result forestall the massive changes that might be embodied in state implementation 
plans, but it could eliminate that possibility altogether if the next administration chooses not to 
pursue a revision.154  If the CPP is remanded without vacatur, the rule remains in force—
meaning regulated parties must comply.155  Of course, as discussed above, a new administration 
might direct EPA to change its policy under this scenario as well.156  But the inertia of 
compliance could be difficult to undo—particularly if the CPP was not stayed pending litigation. 
Part of the lesson here is that the battles of the CPP—its statutory legitimacy and 
reasonableness in particular—will be won or lost not so much on the substance but on the 
remedial choices during and following litigation.  We have described the balancing of interests 
relevant to whether a stay pending litigation should be granted,157 but it is critical to see that the 
impacts of that decision stand to be amplified in a court’s ultimate choice of remedy.  Consider 
these scenarios, all of which would entail a flaw in reasoned decisionmaking (rather than a 
                                                
152 Allied-Signal, Inc. v. NRC, 988 F.2d 146, 150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to 
Deossify Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 75-76 (1995) (noting test favors remand without vacatur for reasoned 
decisionmaking flaws because of likelihood that agencies can substantiate their decisions on remand).  
153 Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (separate op’n of Silberman, J.) (agency must “initiate 
another rulemaking proceeding as if it would seek to confront the problem anew”). 
154 Major rules promulgated under the CAA are notorious for EPA flip-flopping according to presidential policy.  
E.g., Chevron; NOx SIP Call, Homer City (cross-state), MACTs.  
155 Id.  Moreover, subsequent judicial review will be confined to the matters addressed on remand.  See generally 
Hammond, supra note 1495, at 1738 (discussing these distinctions). 
156 See supra text accompanying notes___. 
157 See supra text accompanying notes ___. 
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holding that EPA acted ultra vires).158  First, a court might grant a stay pending litigation, and 
remand with vacatur.  This combination effectively kills compliance and returns the parties to the 
pre-CPP status quo.  Second, a court might grant a stay pending litigation, but remand without 
vacatur.  This combination provides a minor setback in compliance, but permits substantial steps 
toward compliance thereafter (at the risk of a change in administration).  Third, a court might 
decline to grant a stay pending litigation, but remand with vacatur.  This approach would be 
wasteful in hindsight because states will have begun developing their compliance plans during 
the pendency of litigation, only to be relieved of the obligation to comply on remand.159  If the 
coal companies and coal-fired utilities are right about investors’ decisions, moreover, some of 
the coal fleet may be lost during this time.  Finally, a court might decline to grant a stay pending 
litigation and remand without vacatur.  This approach most fully moves compliance forward—
which may result in changes that are irreversible as a practical matter, notwithstanding a change 
in administration.  
  Thus, the normative aspects of the ultimate choice of remedy bear consideration.   The 
practice of remanding without vacatur has been criticized on statutory interpretation grounds;160 
others have raised the normative concern that remands without vacatur are used inappropriately 
to soften the impact of hard-look review.161  Other possible objections are that remanding 
without vacatur can undermine the constitutional underpinnings of the Chenery doctrine by 
                                                
158 For purposes of this discussion, we adopt the premise that some aspect of the CPP will fail the reasoned decision 
making test.  See Pierce, supra note [7 Ways], at 69 (with respect to searches for flaws in agency’s reasoned 
decisionmaking, “[t]hat search will always bear fruit.”).  Of course, if a court holds EPA lacks statutory authority 
under the § 112 exemption or beyond-the-fence-line reasoning we have set forth supra Part II.C, the discussion here 
is moot. 
159 Of course, this is the crux of the hardship prong of the preliminary injunction standard.   
160 E.g., Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Randolph, J., dissenting) (“Setting aside means 
vacating; no other meaning is apparent.”). 
161 The premise here is that searching scrutiny is harmful.  Daniel B. Rodriguez, Of Gift Horses and Great 
Expectations:  Remands Without Vacatur in Administrative Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 601 (2004). 
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leaving in place a rule that cannot stand on an agency’s original reasoning.162  Still, many see the 
flexibility in determining a remedy as solidly grounded in Article III,163 pragmatic in promoting 
court-agency dialogue,164 and useful as a guard against ossification.165 
How does the CPP itself interact with these considerations?  First, we expect judicial 
review in this case to fall on the rigorous end of the spectrum.166  Provided the flaws a court finds 
are remediable, remand without vacatur offers a counter-balance to searching review, albeit 
imperfectly.  Further, the separation-of-powers concerns raised by both the CPP itself and 
judicial review of the Plan are heightened.  As many have recognized, the CPP is a significant 
example of agency activity filling the vacuum left by a gridlocked Congress.167  This fact helps 
justify the extensive need for reason-giving that is embodied in the CAA as well as 
administrative law doctrine, and perhaps offers a reason to weigh our ossification concerns less 
heavily for this particular analysis.  On the other hand, if the need for statutory and democratic 
legitimacy is at its highest when an agency’s action has such sweeping ramifications,168 then a 
flaw in reason-giving admittedly may justify vacatur as a check on agency behavior.  Overall, we 
take a pragmatic view: vacating a remediable rule only reinforces instability and exacerbates the 
problems already noted with a Chevron approach to the interpretive issues.  The reliability of our 
                                                
162 Hammond, supra note 126, at 1784. 
163 Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea:  Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 
DUKE L.J. 291, 361 (referencing “judicial humility”). 
164 Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1346 (1998). 
165 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 77-78 (1995); see also 
William S. Jordan, Ossification Revisited:  Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with 
Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 414 (2000).  
166 Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the 
Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 411 (noting vacillation between 
levels of scrutiny).  The D.C. Circuit has ratcheted up its hard-look review in recent years, though the exact 
approach seems highly dependent on which panel the litigants get.  Compare, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, with 
EME Homer Generation, rev’d, Michigan v. EPA (upholding EPA’s determination that it did not need to consider 
costs in determining whether to regulate air toxics from EGUs).  
167 E.g., Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 20-42 (2014). 
168 Cf. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) (invoking constitutional concerns when 
agency would regulate enormous scope of activity). 
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electricity system, and the impacts of climate change, are issues too serious to bear an on-again, 
off-again approach.  
III.  Implementation Issues 
 Putting aside for now the doctrinal challenges for the CPP, we turn to two major 
implementation issues: (a) the challenges created by fuel-switching to intermittent sources; and 
(b) the limitations states may encounter as a result of retail or wholesale restructuring status.  It 
seems possible that opponents of the CPP might argue that these issues render the CPP arbitrary 
and capricious, but our purpose is not to make those arguments.  Rather, we raise our concerns as 
they relate to our views of energy policy and law more generally. 
A. Challenges Created by Intermittent Sources 
 The largest reductions in GHG emissions expected as a result of implementation of the 
CPP are in building blocks 2 and 3.  As described in Part I above, block 2 contemplates EGUs 
will switch first from coal to natural gas, which would achieve at least some reduction in GHG 
emissions. To achieve even further reductions, block 3 contemplates that EGUs will switch from 
fossil fuels to wind and solar.169  The good news is that the unit cost of producing electricity 
through use of some forms of wind and solar in some locations has declined significantly in 
recent years.170  The bad news is that both wind and solar are intermittent sources of electricity. 
 As Paul Joskow has explained in detail, intermittent sources of electricity are much less 
valuable than dispatchable sources—those that can be called upon to generate electricity at any 
time.171  Almost all EGUs that use fossil fuels are dispatchable, while no EGU that uses wind or 
                                                
169 This is the expectation for the CPP’s compliance period.  As the CPP discusses, other low-carbon sources such as 
nuclear count toward compliance, but were not included in block 3 because of their longer construction times.  CPP 
supra note 1, at 64,803. 
170 INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, RENEWABLE POWER GENERATION COSTS IN 2014 12 – 13 (2015); Tara Patel, 
Bloomberg Business, Fossil Fuels Losing Cost Advantage Over Solar, Wind, IEA Says, Aug. 31, 2015.          
171 Paul Joskow, Comparing the Costs of Intermittent and Dispatchable Generating Technologies, 101 AM. ECON. 
REV. 238 (2012).  
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solar is dispatchable.  That distinction is important because of two basic characteristics of the 
electricity market.  First, demand for electricity varies greatly every minute.  Second, because 
electricity cannot be stored economically, it must be consumed at exactly the same time that it is 
generated.172  Those two characteristics underlie a market in which there must always be enough 
supply to meet current demand and in which electricity is much more valuable at times of peak 
demand than at times of low demand.173  By definition, dispatchable sources, including most 
EGUs that use fossil fuels, are available at times of peak demand.  By contrast, the availability of 
electricity from the sun depends on whether the sun is shining and the availability of electricity 
from wind depends on whether the wind is blowing at a velocity that allows a particular wind 
turbine to turn at a particular speed.174 
 The usefulness of an intermittent source depends on several variables.  First, the 
availability factor of the source is important.  “Availability factor” refers to the amount of time a 
source is able to produce electricity, divided by the amount of time in a given period.175  Fossil-
fueled EGUs typically have much higher availability factors than wind and solar, due again to 
intermittency.  Because intermittent sources may not be available when they are needed, their 
“load-serving capacity” is lower than that of fossil-fueled sources; that is, their nameplate 
capacities are derated to account for unavailability.176  Under this metric, wind’s load-serving 
capacity may be as low as ten percent of its nameplate capacity.177 Second, the correlation 
                                                
172 For an overview, see Hammond & Spence, supra note 119, at 110.  
173 Paul Joskow & Catherine Wolfram, Dynamic Pricing of Electricity, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 381, 381 (2012).   
174 Hammond & Spence, supra note 119, at 125. 
175 See JACK CASAZZA & FRANK DELEA, UNDERSTANDING ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS 88-90 (2010) (discussing 
availability). 
176 Id. at 90. 
177 Id. By contrast, the capacity factor reflects the amount of actual generation of a source over time divided by a 
source’s nameplate capacity.  Data from the past several years show that capacity factors for fossil-fueled sources 
are higher than wind and much higher than solar, once again reflecting in part the ability of the source to generate 
over time. EIA, Monthly Capacity Factors for Select Fuels and Technologies, Jan. 15, 2014, at 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=14611.   Capacity factors are also influenced by the type of load 
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between the periods of time in which an intermittent source is available and the periods of time 
in which demand for electricity is high is an important determinant of the value of a source.  The 
higher the correlation the more valuable the source.  As would be expected, the correlation for 
dispatchable resources is much higher than that for non-dispatchable resources. 
 Third, the usefulness of any source depends on its location.  A source that is close to 
major markets can be used more readily than a source that is farther from major markets, referred 
to as load centers in the electricity industry.  There are two ways to measure the distance between 
a source and a load center.  The first is to calculate the miles between a source and a load center.  
Using this measure a near source is slightly more valuable than a far source because transmission 
of electricity is not costless.  Most of the variable cost of transmission is attributable to line 
loss—electricity lost during the transmission process.  That cost is modest, however, because of 
the extraordinary efficiency of modern ultra-high-voltage transmission lines.178  The far more 
important way of measuring the distance between a source and a load factor is by identifying and 
measuring the effects of the transmission constraints that lie between the source and load centers. 
A source that is five miles from the nearest load center has no value if there is no way to transmit 
it from the source to a load center.179 
 It is difficult to identify and measure the effects of transmission constraints because 
electricity is transmitted on one of three complicated and fully integrated transmission grids.180  
Electricity flows in accordance with Kirchhoff’s law—the amount transmitted over any segment 
                                                                                                                                                       
that the source serves (among many other things).  Base load sources, like nuclear for example, have much higher 
capacity factors because they are nearly always running.  See id. 
178 INST. FOR ENERGY RESEARCH, ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION, at http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/electricity-
transmission/ (Sept. 2, 2014). For general discussion, see CASAZZA & DELEA, supra note 152, at 165. 
179 See ISSER, supra note 118, at 107-08 (describing security-constrained economic dispatch). 
180 Hammond & Spence, supra note 119, at 110.       
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of a grid is inversely proportionational to the impedance on that segment.181  Since the quantity 
of electricity from each of thousands of sources varies every second and the quantity demanded 
at each of hundreds of load centers varies every second, there are hundreds of transmission 
constraints on each grid with widely varying effects.  If a constraint exists only five percent of 
the time and it usually exists only at times of low demand, it is not important.  Conversely, a 
constraint that exists seventy-five percent of the time or that usually exists at times of high 
demand is very important.  A transmission constraint almost always increases the cost of 
electricity by requiring substitution of a more expensive source for a less expensive source.182  
Some of the increased cost is reflected in higher prices for electricity; some is reflected in 
increased emissions of pollutants, including increased emissions of GHGs.  Sometimes a 
transmission constraint produces a local or regional brownout or blackout because the sources 
that are accessible to a load center are not capable of generating enough electricity to 
accommodate the demand at the load center.183 
 Each of these determinants of the usefulness and value of a source of electricity is 
important.  Thus, for instance, if a source has no transmission access to any load center at any 
time, it is worthless.  If it has access seventy-five percent of the time, but it has no access during 
periods of high demand, it has little value.  If a source has a twenty-five percent availability 
factor and a correlation of five percent between the period of time in which it is available and the 
periods of high demand, it is nearly worthless. 
 These complicated characteristics of electricity transmission and markets combine to 
create a situation in which it is difficult to integrate intermittent sources like solar and wind into 
                                                
181 See CASAZZA & DELEA, supra note [152], at 203 (describing transmission simulation programs that solve for 
Kirchhoff’s equation); DOUGLAS C. GIANCOLI, PHYSICS FOR SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS 609 – 11 (2d ed. 1989) 
(setting forth Kirchhoff’s rules). 
182 See Hammond & Spence, supra note 119, at 115 (discussing these considerations). 
183 For a list of major blackouts, see CASAZZA & DELEA, supra  note 175, at 162. 
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a transmission grid at a reasonable cost and with tolerable adverse effects on the reliability of 
electricity service.  The higher the proportion of supply from intermittent sources the greater the 
challenge of integration.  The CPP is ambitious.  It envisions a large increase in the proportion of 
the total electricity supply on each grid that will be provided by intermittent sources. 
 There are five predominant ways in which intermittent sources can be (or are) added to a 
grid at tolerable cost: storage, demand response, providing efficient backup supplies, increased 
access of intermittent sources to load centers, and geographic diversification of the intermittent 
sources that are accessible to each load center.  Everyone agrees that electricity storage at 
reasonable cost is the ideal way to integrate intermittent sources.184  The massive research and 
development efforts that firms have devoted to attempts to further that goal have produced 
encouraging results, but making storage economical remains a challenge.185  For now, research 
and development efforts should continue to be prioritized.186 
 Demand response is also a promising way to ameliorate intermittency and has already 
been used to this effect with some success,187 but its regulatory status is currently uncertain. The 
validity of FERC’s Order 745, which set a uniform pricing scheme for demand response in the 
wholesale markets, is the subject of a pending Supreme Court decision.188 If the Court holds that 
FERC lacks jurisdiction to set such a scheme, it will call into question the viability of demand 
                                                
184 See e.g., Amy Stein, Reconsidering Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case for Energy Storage, University of 
Florida Levin College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series Paper No. 15-15 (2015).     
185 See Dhruv Bhatnagar et al., SANDIA NAT’L LABS., MARKET AND POLICY BARRIERS TO ENERGY STORAGE 
DEPLOYMENT 9–10 (2013).  
186 Other barriers include regulatory issues, market issues in non-RTO/ISO markets, business model issues, and 
technology issues.  Id. at 9.    
187 For an explanation of how demand response assists with integrating distributed generation, see Joel B. Eisen, 
Distributed Energy Resources, “Virtual Power Plants,” and the Smart Grid, 7 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 191 
(2012).   
188 Along with our co-authors, we have argued that FERC has jurisdiction to take this action.  See Amicus Curiae Br. 
of Energy Law Scholars in Supp. of Pet’rs, FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, Nos. 14-840, 14-841 (S. Ct. filed 
July 16, 2015).  
Draft – 12.15.2015 – do not cite without authors’ permission 
 36 
response in the capacity markets,189 which is where demand response aggregators earn most of 
their revenue.190 If the prevailing business model must shift to state-level programs, significant 
state regulatory changes may be necessary and will at the very least cause delay in widespread 
implantation of demand response programs.191 
 Providing additional backup supplies is an additional means of integrating renewables. A 
useful low-carbon backup source for solar and wind is hydropower, if it is operated in storage 
mode—which emphasizes its value as a source of electricity and deemphasizes its value for 
competing purposes like irrigation, recreation, water quality maintenance, and support of aquatic 
species.192 If operated in this way, hydro is rampable; it can be turned on and off quickly just by 
opening and closing control gates.193  Indeed, many European planners have already recognized 
this contribution of hydro, and contemplate that hydro will become increasingly important as 
renewables penetration increases.194  When the sun stops shining or the wind stops blowing, 
Norway, for example, can make up for the sometimes large deficit in electricity supply that 
would otherwise exist in Germany or Denmark by sending large flows of electricity from 
hydropower to replace the electricity that was coming from solar and wind sources.195 
 Hydropower is unlikely to provide much of a solution to the integration problem in the 
United States for several reasons.  First, the United States has access to only modest 
economically viable hydro supplies that are not already in full use for other purposes.196  Second, 
                                                
189 See Am. Compl. of FirstEnergy Serv. Co., No. EL14-55-001, at 3 (FERC filed Sept. 22, 2014) (arguing EPSA 
applies to PJM’s capacity markets). 
190 Remarks of Greg Poulos, Manager, Regulatory Affairs, EnerNOC, Nov. 5, 2015 (notes on file with authors). 
191 Id. 
192 This is not the policy approach of the United States, as described infra. 
193 Hammond & Spence, supra note 119, at 18 n.107. 
194 Eurelectric, Hydro in Europe:  Powering Renewables 34-39 (2011), at 
http://www.eurelectric.org/media/26690/hydro_report_final-2011-160-0011-01-e.pdf.  
195 Id. 
196 Cf. EIA, EIA Projections show hydro growth limited by economics not resources, July 10, 2014 (distinguishing 
studies suggesting greater technical capacity and noting “Because hydropower is a mature technology, most of the 
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the supply of hydropower is more likely to decline rather than to increase in the United States 
because dams are unpopular with the public.197  Third, the United States takes seriously the 
competing uses of dams for other purposes,198 so they are not nearly as reliable a source of 
backup power domestically as they are in northern Europe.  Finally, hydropower’s availability is 
inversely proportional to drought conditions.  California’s drought, for example, is responsible 
for a 9.7% decrease in hydropower generation for 2015, contributing to a nationwide decrease in 
renewables generation of 2.7%.199  Some firms and government officials have recently shown 
interest in building more dams in western Canada to provide the United States with access to 
greatly increased supplies of hydro.200  This is a promising development, but it is far too early to 
count on the success of such efforts in devising a plan to integrate intermittent sources in the U.S. 
grids.201 
 The CPP is predicated on the assumption that natural gas-fired EGUs will provide 
adequate backup power at times when demand is high but intermittent sources are not available.  
Indeed, natural gas is often touted as a fuel that can complement renewables’ intermittency.202  
This is because natural gas-fired EGUs can ramp quickly compared to other sources, so they are 
                                                                                                                                                       
technically and economically superior sites have already been developed.”), at 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=17051 
197 See AMERICAN RIVERS, DAMS AND HYDROPOWER,http://www.americanrivers.org/initiatives/dams/ (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2015) (describing efforts at dam removal). 
198 See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding Federal Power Act’s 
“recreational purposes” language requires agency consideration of environmental impacts); EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, 
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 367 (4th ed. 2015) (“The Scenic Hudson case provided a template for the 
National Environmental Policy Act . . . .”); see also PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 
U.S. 700, 723 (1994) (holding minimum streamflows developed through state water quality certification process 
were acceptable for inclusion in FERC-issed hydro permit). 
199 EIA, SHORT-TERM ENERGY AND WINTER FUELS OUTLOOK 14, Oct. 2015, at 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/pdf/steo_full.pdf.  
200 Emily Holden, Climatewire, How Can Canadian Hydropower Help Meet U.S. Climate Goals?, Aug. 27, 2015. 
201 One can imagine an approval process as heated as that involving the Keystone XL Pipeline; the relevant 
regulatory requirements and procedures are the same.  See Exec. Order 12,038 (Feb. 3, 1978) (transferring to DOE 
authority to grant presidential permits for transmission lines and pipelines crossing international borders). 
202 E.g., David Spence & Ross Baldick, Why America’s power grid needs natural gas now more than ever, 
FORTUNE.COM, Sept. 27, 2015. 
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particularly useful for meeting demand when solar or wind cannot.203  Natural gas-fired EGUs 
also have other characteristics that make them good candidates to provide backup power.  The 
price of natural gas is low at present and is predicted to remain low for the foreseeable future.  
The capital cost of a natural gas-fired EGU is relatively low and the time required to obtain a 
construction permit is relatively short.204  
 Most important for purposes of furthering the goals of the CPP, the most efficient NGCC 
plants emit far less CO2 than coal, as detailed in Part I.  For that reason, the CPP is predicated on 
the assumption that natural gas-fired EGUs can be used both as a backup to the new solar and 
wind supplies that are expected to reduce emissions in block 3 of the CPP and, by replacing coal-
fired EGUs, as the entire basis for the emissions reductions expected in block 2 of the CPP.  
Thus, the success of the CPP is critically dependent on maintaining and increasing the number 
and quantity of electricity generated by natural gas-fired EGUs at a tolerable cost.205 
 The assumption that natural gas-fired EGUs can perform both of those functions at 
tolerable cost is not well-supported.  There are two obstacles to fulfilling that assumption.  First, 
the cost per unit of electricity generated by natural gas-fired EGUs is likely to increase—perhaps 
significantly—as a result of the major changes in the use of natural gas-fired EGUs that are 
contemplated by the CPP.  Traditionally, the most efficient natural gas-fired EGUs have been 
used primarily as baseload supply, i.e., they generate electricity at all times except when 
undergoing maintenance.  The CPP is based on the assumption that over time the primary use of 
                                                
203 BLACK & VEATCH, COST AND PERFORMANCE DATA FOR POWER GENERATION TECHNOLOGIES 9-48 (Feb. 2012), 
http://bv.com/docs/reports-studies/nrel-cost-report.pdf (listing ramp rates and “quick start” rates for various 
generation technologies. 
204 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED COST AND LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES 
IN THE ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015 1 (June 2015), 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/electricity_generation.pdf [hereinafter EIA LCOE Estimates]. 
205 EPA contemplates that in the short-term at least, combustion-turbine natural gas generation will be used as 
renewable support.  CPP, supra note 1, at 64,716–17.  These represent one-fifth of natural-gas-fired capacity, id. at 
61,716, and in any event, are just as reliant on natural gas prices as NGCC. 
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natural gas-fired EGUs will be as backup supplies.  As electricity generated by solar and wind 
increases, therefore, the quantity of electricity generated by natural gas-fired EGUs will 
decrease.206  In other words, natural gas will compete with renewables for baseload market share.  
That, in turn, will increase the cost of electricity per unit generated because the fixed costs of the 
EGUs will have to be recovered in the prices charged for a lower quantity of electricity 
generated.207 
 The second obstacle to fulfilling the assumptions underlying the CPP is related to the first, 
but it is a much more serious obstacle.  EPA assumes that the large increase in the amount of 
electricity generated through use of natural gas-fired EGUs can be met without constructing any 
new units.208  We are skeptical of that assumption.  As EPA has stated in analogous contexts, its 
models should not be used as an indication of what is likely to happen but only as illustrations of 
what might happen.209  Under the CPP, many new natural gas-fired EGUs will have to be built to 
meet the increased need for electricity generated through use of natural gas that is part of the 
basis of both blocks 2 and 3 of the CPP.  It will be challenging to finance those new natural gas 
generators in the dramatically different circumstances in which natural gas-fired EGUs will be 
used after the CPP is implemented.  
 Potential investors base their decisions on the flow of revenue expected as a result of an 
investment.  In the case of a long-lived asset like an EGU, the relevant expected flow is over the 
                                                
206 At least, this is what the CPP seems to contemplate.  Predictions of the future fuel mix are difficult to make even 
without the regulatory uncertainty imposed by the CPP.  Attempts at modeling the proposed rule’s impacts to the 
generation mix resulted in projections that varied considerably. See, e.g., ENERGY INFO. AGENCY, ANALYSIS OF THE 
IMPACTS OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN 14–27 (2015) (providing a summary of the results from projects of the new 
rule), http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/powerplants/cleanplan/pdf/powerplant.pdf [http://perma.cc/NM5E-
49DK]; Michael Wara et al., Peak Electricity and the Clean Power Plan, 28 ELECTRICITY J. 18, 24–25 (2015) 
(providing several predictions for electricity). 
207 This potentially creates a situation similar to that currently being experienced by merchant nuclear power plants 
operating in wholesale markets; their short-run marginal costs are quite low, but their long-run-average costs are not 
compensated by the market because of various distortions.  See generally Hammond & Spence, supra note 119 
(providing this diagnosis).  
208 CPP, supra note 1, at 64,802. 
209 EPA Resp. in Opp’n, No. 15-1277, Doc. No. 1570665, at 29 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 31, 2015). 
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expected life of the asset—thirty to forty years in the case of an EGU.210  The revenue flow 
expected from an investment in a natural gas-fired EGU in the conditions created by the CPP 
will be much lower than the flow expected from an investment in a natural gas-fired EGU that is 
used as a baseload source.211  Once natural gas-fired EGUs are used primarily as backups for 
wind and power, the expected revenue flow will be lower, and it will decline over time as the 
quantity of electricity expected to be generated from solar and wind increases.212  
 Moreover, the CPP may cause prospective investors to view investments in new natural 
gas-fired EGUs as high-risk.  Since the purpose of the CPP is to reduce emissions of GHGs, and 
natural gas-fired EGUs emit large quantities of GHGs, prospective investors will be concerned 
that the CPP is only step one in the effort to reduce emissions of GHGs.  Indeed, others have 
identified this issue as a policy imperative.213  The most logical step two would be a program to 
replace natural gas-fired EGUs with carbon-free sources.  Thus, prospective investors will attach 
a high degree of uncertainty to the revenue flows they expect from an investment in a new EGU 
over the expected life of the EGU. 
 Low, declining, and uncertain expected revenue flows discourage investors.  It is not at 
all clear that the conditions created by the CPP will be consistent with the investments in new 
natural gas-fired EGUs that we believe to be critical to the success of the CPP.  If the market 
conditions do not produce enough investment, it is far from certain that the government will be 
willing to subsidize investments in new natural gas-fired EGUs, knowing that they are a 
significant source of GHG emissions.  If enough new natural gas-fired EGUs can be financed in 
                                                
210 See generally EIA LCOE ESTIMATES (describing these considerations). 
211 A commentator to the proposed CPP argued that redirecting natural gas to supporting renewables calls into 
question EPA’s anticipated 75% utilization rate of existing NGCC.  CPP, supra note 1, at 64,803. 
212 See id. 
213 See MIT, The Future of Natural Gas 9 (2010) (arguing higher GHG emission targets could “require the complete 
de-carbonization of the power sector”). 
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the conditions created by the CPP, the cost of the capital required to make those investments will 
be high, given the low, declining, and risky expected flow of revenues.  That, coupled with the 
increased unit cost caused by the reductions in output of natural gas-fired EGUs, will make the 
critical gas components of the CPP costly. 
 The third way in which intermittent sources can be integrated at tolerable cost and with 
tolerable decreases in the reliability of electricity service is by maximizing the access of wind 
and power sources to major load centers.  Many of the most desirable locations for wind farms 
and solar EGUs are remote from major load centers.  Thus, for instance, the plains states have 
the kind of relatively high and constant wind velocity that make them particularly attractive 
locations for wind farms, while the deserts in the southwestern states have conditions that make 
them particularly attractive locations for solar EGUs.214  Both are far from major load centers, 
however. 
 The most desirable locations for wind and solar can be exploited only if they are 
connected to major load centers with new ultra-high voltage transmission lines.  Professors 
Alexandra Klass and Elizabeth Wilson have explained in detail why that outcome is unlikely to 
happen in a timely manner without a major change in law.215  Most other important parts of the 
energy infrastructure, like gas pipelines and liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) plants, can begin 
construction as soon as they receive authorization from a federal agency.216  The process of 
obtaining that authorization takes an average of less than two years.217 
                                                
214 Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A 
Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1832-47 (2012).       
215 Id. at 1858-73. 
216 See Alexandra Klass, Future-proofing Energy Transport Law, at 20 (2015) (describing relative ease of 
authorizing this infrastructure) (draft on file with authors). 
217 Id. at 35. 
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 But transmission lines can be constructed only if they are authorized by state, and 
sometimes even local, governments.218  The process of obtaining that authorization routinely 
takes a decade, often takes far longer, and sometimes proves to be impossible.219  The source of 
this problem is a mismatch between the geographic scope of the costs and benefits of 
transmission lines.  A new transmission line usually produces some aesthetic harm and few 
benefits in the state that must authorize it.  That state may come to the conclusion that the costs 
of the line to the state's residents exceed its benefits to the residents.  It may then decide not to 
authorize construction of the line or, at least not to expedite the process of deciding whether to 
authorize the line.  
 Viewed from a national perspective, however, the benefits of the line may be much 
greater than its costs.  If a federal agency had the power to decide whether to authorize the line, it 
could make a quick affirmative decision.  Given the importance to the success of the CPP of 
providing access to markets for solar EGUs and wind farms, a federal agency with the power to 
authorize construction of a transmission line would be able to match the two-year average time it 
now takes Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) to authorize construction of a gas 
pipeline or LNG plant.220  
 The final way in which intermittent sources can be integrated at tolerable cost and with a 
tolerable decrease in the reliability of electricity service is through geographic diversification of 
sources.  A respected consulting firm has issued a report in which it concluded that the problem 
                                                
218 Klass & Wilson, supra note 185, at 1830. 
219 Klass, supra note 185, at __. 
220 Courts have significantly limited FERC’s ability to carry out national transmission siting, notwithstanding that 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 appeared to give FERC at least somewhat greater authority than it has traditionally 
had.  See, e.g., Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. DOE, 631 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting DOE’s designation of 
National Interest Electric Transmission Corridor); Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(limiting FERC’s federal siting authority to circumstances in which states have failed to act, rather than denied, 
transmission construction certificates). 
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of integrating intermittent sources can be solved through geographic diversification of sources.221  
That conclusion seems plausible.  If a large number of wind and solar generators are connected 
in different locations, grid operators can maximize the probability that power will be available 
from some combination of intermittent sources at all times.  When the wind decreases in one 
area, it is likely to increase in other areas, and a cloudy day in the location of some solar sources 
is likely to be offset by sunshine in the location of other sources or by healthy wind velocity in 
locations with wind farms.  Denmark has made good use of this strategy:  the key to its success 
has been the existence of a robust transmission grid.222 
 The United States is severely limited in its ability to use geographic diversification of 
sources as a means of integrating intermittent sources.  In most locations, the regional grids lack 
the capacity to transmit significant quantities of electricity generated from locations with 
differing weather conditions to load centers.223  To engage in effective geographic diversification 
of sources, the United States would have to strengthen the grids substantially by constructing 
many new transmission lines in a timely manner.  That is impossible with our current allocation 
of permitting authority to state governments. 
 Absent some unexpected dramatic improvement in the ability to store electricity at 
tolerable cost or rapidly construct major transmission lines, integrating substantial intermittent 
sources as contemplated by the CPP will be difficult and expensive.  It will be difficult, if not 
impossible, to accomplish that task successfully without a change in the allocation of power to 
                                                
221 Patrick Luckow, Tommy Vitolo & Joseph Daniel, Synapse Energy Economics, A Solved Problem: Existing 
Measures Provide Low-Cost Wind and Solar Integration 8-9  (Aug. 25, 2015).    
222 Store, Overview of the Danish Transmission System and RES Integration 8-11 (2013); see also Amelia Reiver 
Schlusser, Renewable, Reliable, Resilient: Policy Approaches for Maintaining Reliability in the Western Grid Under 
the Clean Power Plan 20 (Oct. 2015) (emphasizing benefits of geographic diversification but identifying 
transmission hurdle). 
223 Am. Wind Energy Ass’n & Solar Energy Indus. Ass’n, Green Power Superhighways (2009), available at, 
https://www.awea.org/files/FileDownloads/pdfs/GreenPowerSuperhighways.pdf.  
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authorize construction of transmission lines.  If states retain that power, it is hard to imagine how 
the CPP can succeed.  It follows that the two most important steps the United States must take to 
implement the CPP are continued aggressive research and development efforts to identify less 
expensive ways of storing electricity, and switching the power to authorize construction of a 
transmission line from state governments to the federal government. 
B. The Interaction of Preemption Doctrine and State Electricity Regulation 
 As states consider how to implement the section 111(d) standards, they must also 
confront the many barriers stemming from our constitutional structure.  For example, the 
dormant Commerce Clause limits their options in designing renewable-portfolio or low-carbon 
fuel standards.224  The Supremacy Clause also limits state options, particularly with respect to the 
preemptive reach of the CAA,225 FPA,226 and Atomic Energy Act.227  An issue that has attracted 
little attention,228 however, concerns the interplay between a state’s restructuring status and 
preemption doctrine.  Recent preemption litigation involving the FPA suggests that a state’s 
status matters for how it can comply with the CPP. 
                                                
224 E.g., N.D. v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891 (D. Minn. 2014), appeal filed, No. 14-2156 (8th Cir. filed May 19, 
2014) (holding Minnesota’s Next Generation Energy Act invalid as per se violation of dormant Commerce Clause); 
see Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental Regulation:  The 
Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOL. L.Q. 243, 250 (1999) (arguing trade barriers should be permissible under 
certain conditions); Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dorman Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: 
Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295, 355-56 (2013) (arguing, 
among other things, for intermediate rather than strict scrutiny of state RPSs); Steven Ferrey, Solving the 
Multimillion Dollar Constitutional Puzzle Surrounding State “Sustainable” Energy Policy, 49 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 121, 133-40 (2014) (describing state RPSs and dormant Commerce Clause doctrine). 
225 Cf. Bell v. Cheswick Generating Sta., 734 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding CAA does not preempt state-tort 
putative class action involving coal-fired power plant’s ash and contaminants settling on landowners’ property). 
226 E.g., Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988) (holding Supremacy Clause 
compelled Mississippi to permit utility to recover through its state rates, wholesale costs that FERC had determined 
were just and reasonable); cf. ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015) (holding Natural Gas Act 
provisions that are read in pari materia with FPA do not preempt state anti-trust claims against natural gas traders). 
227 E.g., Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 F.3d 393, 428 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that AEA 
preempted various Vermont attempts to close nuclear power plant). 
228 Cf. Hammond & Spence, supra note 119, at Part III.B (considering the issue as it relates to states’ abilities to 
incentivize particular electricity fuel sources). 
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 The relevant cases involve Maryland and New Jersey, which are restructured states 
operating in the PJM Interconnection.  Both determined in the early 2000s that the PJM capacity 
market was not incentivizing sufficient investment in new electricity generation.229  New 
Jersey’s legislature, for example, expressly found that the capacity market had “not resulted in 
large additions of peaking facilities or any additions of intermediate or base load resources 
available to the region and the State.”230  The two states passed statutes that would subsidize new 
natural gas construction within their borders.  Both accomplished this goal by assuring new 
generation a fixed revenue stream for supplying electrical capacity that cleared the PJM capacity 
market.231  Several existing electricity generators challenged the statutes, arguing they were 
preempted by the FPA.  
 Both the Third and Fourth Circuits held that field preemption forbade the statutes because 
the wholesale markets are within FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction.  The Fourth Circuit decision in 
particular emphasized that by restructuring, Maryland had “throw[n] in its lot with the federal 
interstate markets” and thereby compelled electricity generators within its borders to sell 
electricity in the wholesale market.232  Having done so, the state could not then regulate how its 
generators interacted with that market—notwithstanding the states’ traditional authority over 
electricity siting and construction.233  The subsidy, reasoned the court, attempted to directly 
regulate capacity market prices by setting the price that generators would receive for capacity.234  
This the state could not do. 
                                                
229 PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014), pet’n for cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 12, 2014); PPL 
Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014), pet’n for cert. filed (U.S. Nov. 26, 2014). 
230 N.J. STAT. § 48:3-98.2(b). 
231 Solomon, 766 F.3d at 246; Nazarian, 753 F.3d at 473. 
232 753 F.3d at 473; see also 766 F.3d at 248 (emphasizing that in restructuring, “New Jersey divorced the entities 
that generate electricity from those that supply it.”). 
233 753 F.3d at 473.  
234 753 F.3d at 476-77. 
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 These holdings are notable for two interrelated reasons.  First, the markets themselves are 
frequently criticized for failing to incentivize new construction because they are based on short-
run marginal costs but often include price caps.235  Capacity markets are one response; ERCOT’s 
very high price caps are another.236  Despite these modifications to the wholesale markets, 
commentators continue to express concern that there are inadequate incentives for investors.237  
As described above, moreover, the CPP may heighten these concerns for natural gas.238  
But to the extent states would step in to incentivize new capacity as part of their CPP 
compliance, the capacity cases show the options are limited.  Indeed, the second reason to pay 
attention to these cases is that they show how restructured states may have less flexibility than 
their traditionally regulated counterparts.  Compare, for example, Georgia and South Carolina, 
which are traditionally regulated states with vertically integrated utilities whose wholesale sales 
do not take place on spot markets.  These states have incentivized new nuclear construction—
which will count toward CPP compliance—by guaranteeing that the utilities can recover the 
carrying costs of construction through their rates.239  The capacity market issue is irrelevant in 
this context because these states have not disaggregated electricity generation from supply.  
Instead, the states are free to determine that new capacity is needed and to incentivize new 
construction through the rates they authorize. 
                                                
235 See Hammond & Spence, supra note 119, at 130 (describing concerns); Pierce, Completing the Process of 
Restructuring the Electricity Market, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 469 (2006) (criticizing price caps). 
236 See Hammond & Spence, supra note 119, at 173-74 (describing these approaches). 
237 Sources cited supra note 74. 
238 Supra/infra text accompanying notes___. The CPP says almost nothing about capacity markets.  The only 
reference in the preamble is in a description of how RTO/ISOs work to ensure reliability. CPP, supra note 1, at 
64,667.  The CPP obliquely references power pools only to provide historical context.  CPP at 64,796 (“Prior to 
electricity restructuring, this dispatch was typically operated by major vertically-integrated utilities or by public 
power entities.” Over the last 15 years, large portions of the power grid are now independently operated by ISOs or 
RTOs.”). 
239 For a full description, see Hammond & Spence, supra note 119, at Part II.C.1. 
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  And what of traditionally regulated states whose generators operate in a Regional 
Transmission Organization (“RTO”) or Independent System Operator (“ISO”) market?240  The 
logic of the capacity cases suggests that these states too are foreclosed from approaches like 
those Maryland and New Jersey took.  And states that are traditionally regulated but in which 
generation resources operate in any RTO/ISOs or power pool241 face additional complexity.  To 
be sure, the capacity cases noted that options like direct subsidies and tax rebates242 might avoid 
preemption concerns; these may be available under state law irrespective of restructuring status.  
Our point is not that states are left with no options.  It is that those options are both variable and 
dependent on restructuring status.  EPA glosses over state complexity by falling back on 
flexibility and the grid’s resiliency, but in doing so it fails to anticipate the ramifications of states’ 
restructuring decisions for CPP compliance.                                                               
IV. Conclusion 
  We end where we began.  We support the CPP but we are concerned about the effects of 
some of the difficult legal issues it presents and some of the difficult implementation issues it 
presents.  We cannot resist making one more point.  It would be easy to accomplish all of the 
goals of the CPP more efficiently and effectively, with much lower transactions costs and much 
lower potential unintended adverse effects by taking just two steps.  If the United States were to 
enact a carbon tax243 and switch to real-time pricing of electricity,244 then the United States could 
realistically expect that market forces would do the rest of the job. 
                                                
240 An interactive map may be found at FERC, Electric Power Markets:  National Overview, 
http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/overview.asp.  
241 Kentucky is one such state, though it has a law forbidding mandated fuel switching or renewable additions for 
CPP compliance.  See Jean Chemnick, E&E NEWS, Kentucky regulators walk tightrope on Clean Power Plan, Mar. 
4, 2015, http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060014457.  
242 753 F.3d at 478; 766 F.3d at 253 n.4. 
243 The tax would need to be set at an optimal level; some authors have suggested about fort dollars per ton. See, e.g., 
Warwick McKibbon, Adele Morris & Peter Wilcoxen, Controlling Carbon Emissions From U.S. Power Plants: How 
a Tradable Performance Standard Compares to a Carbon Tax (Aug. 3, 2015). Admittedly, tax policies suffer from 
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regulatory fluctuation—an ill we have identified herein with respect to administrative law doctrine.  E.g., EISEN ET 
AL., supra note [199], at 784-85 (“The [production tax credit’s] record is a sad story of ‘Same Time, Next Year.’”).  
244 Paul Joskow & Catherine Wolfram, Dynamic Pricing of Electricity, 102 American Economic Review 381 (2012).      
